Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Питер Дейл Скотт

Fazle Haq was the governor of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier province; at the same time he was also an important CIA contact and supporter of the Afghan mujahideen, some of whom—it was no secret—were supporting themselves by major opium and heroin trafficking through the North-West Frontier province. By 1982, Fazle Haq would be listed by Interpol as an international narcotics trafficker. However, after lengthy correspondence with Fazle Haq’s son, I am persuaded that there are no known grounds to accuse Fazle Haq of having profited personally from the drug traffic. See “Clarification from Peter Dale Scott re Fazle Haq,” 911Truth.org, http://www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20090223165146219.

46. M. Emdad-ul Haq, Drugs in South Asia: From the Opium Trade to the Present Day (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 204–5, quoted in McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 480.

47. Levy and Scott-Clark, Deception, 128.

48. Washington Post, November 11, 2007, B01.

49. Guardian, May 31, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/31/

nuclear.internationalcrime. According to David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector in Washington, the network member, Urs Tinner, was recruited by the CIA from 1999 to 2000 and “was on the CIA payroll for a very large sum of money.”

50. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 129 (Casey); Prados, Safe for Democracy, 489 (Langley).

51. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 131–34.

52. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, 2004, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2004/Chap3_opium.pdf.

53. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 162, 191, 286–87. McCoy’s estimate of the Kuomintang’s impact on expanding production is extremely conservative. According to Bertil Lintner, the foremost authority on the Shan states of Burma, “The annual production increased from a mere 30 tons at the time of independence [1945] to 600 tons in the mid-1950s” (Bertil Lintner, “Heroin and Highland Insurgency,” in Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block, War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992], 288). Furthermore, the Kuomintang’s exploitation of the Shan states led thousands of hill tribesmen to flee to northern Thailand, where opium production also increased.

54. State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan, “Opium Production in Afghanistan (1980–2005),” http://www.az-customs.net/en/hq15.htm.

55. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 464.

56. Beaty and Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank, 295.

57. Council on Foreign Relations, “Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2007,” August 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/14099/afghanistan_opium_survey_2007.html.

58. Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 33.

59. San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 1997, A10. Francois allegedly controlled the capital, Port-au-Prince, with a network of hirelings who profited on the side from drug trafficking.

60. Time, November 29, 1993, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/

0,9171,979669,00.html: “The shipments continued, however, until Guillen tried to send in 3,373 lbs. of cocaine at once. The DEA, watching closely, stopped it and pounced.” Cf. New York Times, November 23, 1996 (“one ton”).

61. CBS News Transcripts, 60 Minutes, November 21, 1993.

62. Wall Street Journal, November 22, 1996. The information about the drug activities of Guillen Davila and François had been published in the U.S. press years before the indictments. It is probable that, had it not been for the controversy aroused by Gary Webb’s Contra-cocaine stories in the August 1996 San Jose Mercury, these two men and their networks would have been as untouchable as other kingpins in the global CIA drug connection whom we shall discuss, such as Miguel Nassar Haro in Mexico.

63. Chris Carlson, “Is the CIA Trying to Kill Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez?” Global Research, April 19, 2007.

64. Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Pack: The People, Politics and Espionage Intrigues That Shaped the DEA (Springfield, OR: TrineDay, 2009), 400; Time, November 23, 1993. McFarlin had worked with antiguerrilla forces in El Salvador in the 1980s. The CIA station chief in Venezuela, Jim Campbell, also retired.

65. Peter Dale Scott, “Washington and the Politics of Drugs,” Variant 2, no. 11 (Summer 2000): 3–6; Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, vii–xiv.

66. CBS, 60 Minutes, November 21, 1993. Cf. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 400.

67. At the time, the CIA was plotting, successfully, to bring down Pablo Escandar, chief of the Medellín cartel, using the assistance of the drug-trafficking death squad leader Carlos Castaño, who was working for the rival Cali cartel (Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 88).

68. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 89, citing Paul Eddy, The Cocaine Wars (New York: Norton, 1988), 342 (Blum).

69. “Afghan Drug Trafficking Brings US $50 Billion a Year,” RussiaToday, August 20, 2009, http://russiatoday.com/Top_News/2009-08-20/afghanistan-us-drug

-trafficking.html. Cf. “Russian State TV Suggests USA Involved in Drug-Trafficking from Afghanistan,” RAWANews, February 18, 2008, http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/02/17/russian-state-tv-suggests-usa-involved-in-drug-trafficking-from

-afghanistan.html.

70. David Bromwich, New York Review of Books, November 20, 2008, 33.

Chapter 1: Sanctioned Violence, the

Dominance Machine, and the Overworld

1. Gareth Jenkins, “Susurluk and the Legacy of Turkey’s Dirty War,” Terrorism Monitor, May 1, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article

.php?articleid=2374142.

2. Martin A. Lee, “Turkey’s Drug-Terrorism Connection,” ConsortiumNews, January 25, 2008, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/012408a.html.

3. Lucy Komisar, “The Assassins of a Pope,” Albion Monitor, April 6, 1997, http://www.monitor.net/monitor/9703b/turkeycia-sidebar.html: “Both had worked together in a previous assassination effort. In 1979, Ali Agca killed a Turkish newspaper editor. Catli was in on the plot. When the police arrest[ed] Agca, they found a false passport belonging to Catli. Catli then reportedly helped organize Agca’s escape from an Istanbul military prison, and some have suggested Catli was even involved in the Pope’s assassination attempt.” In 1998 Le Monde diplomatique alleged that Abdullah Çatli had organized the assassination attempt on the pope “in exchange for the sum of 3 million German marks” for the Grey Wolves (“Turkey’s Pivotal Role in the International Drug Trade,” Le Monde diplomatique, July 1998).

4. Ertugrul Kurkcu, “Turkey: Trapped in a Web of Covert Killers,” Covert Action Quarterly 61, http://mediafilter.org/CAQ/caq61/CAQ61turkey.html.

5. Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Pack: The People, Politics and Espionage Intrigues that Shaped the DEA (Springfield, OR: TrineDay, 2009), 140.

6. Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: